technical de nitions that biologists assign words like these differ substantially from the meanings (or connotations) that the same words have in ordinary usage. The most useful labels are ones that capture critical elements of the phenomena and provide accurate insight about its function. This is ne in theory, but problematic in practice. It means that we ought to have a fairly good understanding of the function of a behavior before we label it. However, we often nd it useful to name a behavior well before we fully understand it. Of course, we can change a label if we discover that it is inappropriate. Consider, for example, the terms that we have used for interactions directed toward young infants. Monkeys, particularly females, seem to nd young infants extremely attractive, and frequently approach the mother and try to touch, muzzle, inspect, groom, and pull on the newborn infant. These behaviors have been variously described as 'aunting ' (Rowell et al., 1964) , 'allomaternal care' (O'Brien & Robinson, 1991 , Stanford, 1992 , 'infant grabbing' (Small & Smith, 1981) and 'kidnapping' (Silk, 1980) . All of these terms imply something about the putative function of the behavior. Clearly, aunting implied that these behaviors had benign outcomes for the infant, while kidnapping implied that the behavior was potentially harmful to the infant. However, no single interpretation is necessarily correct in every case (Hrdy, 1976; Paul, 1999) , and a more neutral term has been introduced, 'infant handling' (Maestripieri, 1994) . Although we can simply relabel behaviors as our understanding of their function changes, this is not always effective. Labels seem to be strangely persistent. The terms, aunting and kidnapping, continued to be used long after we had good reasons to suspect that the connotations of these words were not appropriate for the phenomena that we observe.
The goal of this paper is to consider some of the implications of using the word 'friendship' to describe close social relationships among nonhuman primates. The use of this term implies that the social bonds formed by some pairs of nonhuman primates are roughly analogous to human friendships and serve similar emotional, psychological, and adaptive functions. This raises several related questions: (1) What kinds of properties do relationships characterized as friendships have? (2) How can we study these kinds of relationships in nonhuman primates? (3) What evolutionary forces shape the dynamics of these kinds of relationships in primates (including humans)? (4) What are the adaptive consequences of friendship?
